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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
unconstitutional. The New York Court of Appeals in order to
reach the contrary result would have had to hold that state
action includes indirect as well as direct acts by a state or its
agents. But this latter approach does not seem unreasonable.
It is not stretching the concept of what constitutes state action
too far to say that approval, acquiescence in, ratification of dis-
criminatory acts, and financial assistance given to a corporation
which discriminates, if done by a state, constitutes state action.
The state of New York, acting through its agent, New York
City, did the very things mentioned above. But New York City
was not the only agency through which New York state had
acted. Both Stuyvesant Town and the Metropolitan Insurance
Company are corporations. Corporations are in existence only
with the consent of the state. Therefore, corporations are crea-
tures of the state, and as such, act with state authority. Hence,
it is at least arguable that, when a corporation discriminates,
the state is discriminating. Corporate action can be said to
constitute state action as stated in the 14th Amendment. It is
conceded that the ancient doctrine of what constitutes state
action would have to be amplified; but under the social condi-
tions existing today, a contrary result in the Stuyvesant case
would be desirable practicably and correct judicially. It is sub-
mitted that the phrase "state action" has proved sufficiently
elastic in the past to bear the additional stretch necessary to
make it cover such a situation.
RICHARD L. Ross
CRIMINAL LAW - MINNESOTA YOUTH CONSERVATION ACT-
VALIDITY UNDER CONSTITUTION
The defendant, Meyer, an eighteen-year-old youth, pleaded
guilty to the crime of third degree burglarly. His objection to
the imposition of sentence under the Minnesota Youth Conser-
vation Act on the ground of its unconstitutionality was sus-
tained, and that question was certified to the Minnesota Supreme
Court. The appellate tribunal reversed the trial court, stating
that the Youth Conservation Act is not an invasion or infringe-
ment of the constitutional powers of any branch of government
nor a deprivation of any personal liberty or right guaranteed
thereini
1. State v. Meyer, 37 N. W. 2d 3 (Minn. 1949).
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Faced by an alarming increase in crime and, more particularly,
that committed by youthful offenders, the legislature of Minne-
sota in 1947 adopted the Youth Conservation Act,2 patterning
it with slight variations on the Youth Correction Authority Act3
promulgated by the American Law Institute in 1940. To stem
the tide of this youthful crime wave, the Minnesota act created
a five man commission which was invested with extensive power
and control over youths under the age of twenty-one years at
the time of their apprehension who were found guilty of a
felony or gross misdemeanor in either a juvenile or district
court.'
With respect to juvenile court cases the act required that the
youth be committed to the custody of the commission unless the
court exercised is retained authority to place the youth on pro-
bation or to make some other disposition of the case not amount-
ing to commitment to a state training school. As to youths
convicted of a felony or gross misdemaanor in a district court,
sentence to the commission for the maximum term prescribed
by the statute for the crime was made mandatory unless the
district court after a pre-sentence investigation placed the youth
on probation. The district court under the act retained the
power to commit a convicted youth directly to a penal institu-
tion in only one instance, namely, where the required penalty
for the crime was life imprisonment or where a life sentence
might be imposed by the trial judge in the exercise of his dis-
cretion.
The power of control granted to the commission as to both
the character and duration of confinement, if any, of a youth
committed to it, however, was made by the terms of the act to
vary considerably depending on whether the youth was tried
and sentenced in a juvenile or district court. Upon commit-
ment by a juvenile court the commission had the right to retain
control of the youth until he reached the age of twenty-one
years, at which time the offender had to be discharged. The
commission, however, could discharge the youth entirely from
its control before the age of twenty-one years was reached.
Such youths committed to it by a juvenile court could be con-
2. Minn. Laws 1947, c. 595.
3. 17 PROCEDINGs A. L. I. 148 (1940).
4. Pirsig, Procedural Aspects of the Youth Conservation Act, 32 MINN.
L. REV. 471 (1948).
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fined by the commission in a training school, placed on proba-
tion or, after confinement, paroled, but in no event could the
youth be confined in a penal institution. On the other hand,
when the commitment to the commission was made by a district
court, the commission had the authority to confine the youth in
a penal institution, to place him on probation or, after confine-
ment, to parole him on such terms as it might prescribe for the
best interest of both the youth and society. The youth so sen-
tenced to the commission by a district court had to be discharged
at the expiration of the maximum term prescribed by the statute
creating the crime. If, however, before the expiration of that
term, the youth attained the age of twenty-five years, he was
then to be discharged unless the commission found that to do
so would be dangerous to the public, in which event the youth
was to be turned over to the regular adult criminal agencies.
These, briefly, are the provisions incorporated by the legis-
lature of Minnesota into its Youth Conservation Act in its
attack on youthful crime and delinquency, which were caused
by defendant Meyer's objection to sentence to be brought before
the scrutiny of the supreme judicial body of the state for com-
parison with the fundamental principles of government em-
bodied in both the Federal and state Constitution. The major
constitutional indictments of the act presented by the de-
fendant were that it violated the principle of governmental
separation of powers and constituted a violation of the consti-
tutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of the
law. That there was no justifiable validity in such contentions
was made evident by the supreme court's review of the almost
unanimous upholding of the indeterminate sentence legislation
of that and other states with which this Minnesota act was
similar in many respects and by an examination of the precedent
established by the Supreme Court of California s upholding the
very similar Youth Correction Act of that state against an-
alogous arguments. Thus, the Supreme Court of Minnesota in
declaring the validity of the Minnesota Youth Conservation Act
neither bestowed upon the legal profession any new constitu-
tional doctrines nor made any unprecedented expansion or de-
velopment of those principles already existing.
What then is the significance and importance of the Minnesota
5. In re Herrera, 23 Cal. 2d 206, 143 P. 2d 345 (1943).
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Youth Conservation statute and this supreme court decision
upholding its constitutionality? Can it be said that this decision
is fostering some new and novel panacea for the ills of youthful
crime and delinquency? Viewed as a whole, the act is, indeed,
a relatively new innovation, a product of the current decade.
Since 1940 when the model act was promulgated by the American
Law Institute, only four states have adopted it in some modified
form. California, the pioneer state in this progressive movement,
put into practice the fundamental principles and machinery of
the model act in 1941,6 and its action has been followed by only
Minnesota and Wisconsin7 in 1947 and Massachusetts8 in 1948.
Viewed in quite another sense, however, the act is by no means
revolutionary. If broken down into its integral and component
parts, it is not a radical offer of new and untried practices sup-
ported only in theory. Almost every detail of the act is already
the accepted law or the approved practice in one or more states.
In reality the act does nothing more than gather together these
practices actually in effect and accepted as wise under the legis-
lation of numerous states, not all of which had been followed in
any one state prior to the California experiment, and integrates
them into a co-ordinated procedure in the hands of one single
administrative body capable of effectively dealing with the
peculiar problems of youth.' The act is, thus, unique in that it
combines many features not in themselves unique.
Furthermore, the act is novel, as a whole, in that it frankly
departs from the punitive approach when dealing with convicted
juveniles. In theory the ancient doctrine of compensatory
punishment for crime, especially as applied to youthful offenders,
has long ago been abandoned, its inefficacy as a method of con-
trolling crime being fully recognized. Yet, the Committee of the
Minnesota Bar Association on the Youth Correction Authority
Act had frankly to admit that, in general, the facilities available
for the correction and treatment of youth in that state, especially
those between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, were no
different from those existing for adult criminals, citing in its
6. CAL. STAT. 2522 (1941).
7. Wis. Laws 1946-1947, c. 546.
8. Acts and Resolves of Mass. 1948, c. 310.
9. Waite, The Youth Cirection Authority Act, 9 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
600 (1942).
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report numerous instances of youths being intermixed in penal
institutions with hardened criminals.10
By limiting the power of the court to commit a youth to even
a state training school and requiring it instead to sentence the
youth for an indeterminate period1 to an integrated and unified
administrative body such as the commission with the facilities12
and personnel 3 necessary for effective solution of the peculiar
problems of youth, the act gives full effect to the more modern
theory with its goal of rehabilitation, correction and reform
by substituting for mass punishment individualized treatment
and scientific methods of examination.- The Youth Conserva-
tion Act is, therefore, an attempt to find the most effective
method of ultimately rehabilitating and reforming the crim-
inally inclined youth as an individual and, thereby, to return to
society, as useful, law-abiding citizens, youthful offenders as
a whole. RICHARD C. WARMANN
EVIDENCF-MEMORANDA TO AID RECOLLECTION-ADMISSIBLE
EITHER AS PAST RECOLLECTION RECORDED OR AS PRESENT RECOL-
LECTION REvIVED.-In an appeal from a decision of the United
States District Court affirming the conviction of one Riccardi of
feloniously having transported or having caused to be trans-
ported stolen property in interstate commerce, the United States
Court of Appeals, in United States v. Riccardi, affirmed the judg-
ment of the District Court, holding that there was no abuse of
discretion by the trial court in determining that a writing may
be used by an owner as an aid to memory in reviving a present
recollection enumerating a numerous list of household articles,
as well as by an antique dealer, qualified as an expert, to revive
his present recollection that he might give his opinion as to the
value of the chattels based on his prior knowledge of them.
The defendant, Riccardi, transported in a truck and station
10. See 28 MINN. L. REV. 300 (1944).
11. Bennett, Indeterminate Control of Offenders: Realistic and Protec-
tive, 9 LAw & CONTEmP. PRoB. 617 (1942).
12. Ellington, Youth Correction: Institutional Facilities for Treatment,
9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROs. 667 (1942).
13. Ellis, Youth Correction: Personnel Considerations Relating to the
Authority Plan, 9 LAW & CONTEMP'. PROS. 704 (1942).
14. Healy, Youth Correction: Principles of Diagnosis, Treatment, and
Prognosis, 9 LAw & CONTMIP. PROB. 681 (1942).
1. 174 F. 2d 883 (3d Cir. 1949).
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